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SUPREME COURT OF 01110. 6
ASSAULT AND BATTERY. See Damages.
AssuMPSIT.
Money had and received, etc.-In an action brought against a city by
its mayor, to recover the costs taxed by him in his own fhvor in certain
cases against persons charged with violating the ordinances of the city,
in which cases such persons were fined, and in defiult of payment were
sentenced to hard labor in the city prison, until such labor, at a stipu-
lated rate, would amount to a sum equal to the fine and costs in such
cases, and the person were put to work in the city prison, and per-
formed the required labor for the benefit of the city: Held, that this
did not constitute a collection and appropriation by the city of the costs
taxed in favor of the mayor in such cases, from which the law will im-
ply a promise on the part of the city to pay the amount of such costs
to the mayor : Gibson v. City of Zanesville, 31 Ohio St.
-ATTORNEY. See Judgment; Trust and Trustee.
Privileyed Commnicatios.-Communications made to an attorney in
the course of a professional consultation, which do not relate to the
subject-matter of the consultation, are not privileged: State v. .1Miwltor-
ter, 46 Iowa.
Where an attorney has received money which he is to hold until the
question of its ownership shall be determined between the parties, he
cannot in a proceeding of garnishment refuse to state where he has de-
posited the money, on the ground that his knowledge of the matter is
privileged: Williams Brothers v. Young, 46 Iowa.
Contract-Fees.-Where an attorney, who had undertaken to prose-
cute a case under a contract fixing his fees therefor, after rendering cer-
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tain services transferred the management of the case to another attor-
ney, whom he represented to his client that he had simply associated
with himself in the case, held, that the attorney to whom the case was
transferred was bound by the contract in the absence of knowledge and
assent by the client to its termination : Ennis v. ffultz, 46 Iowa.
BAILMENT.
What consttutes-Redelivery of identical Article.-The question of
bailment or not is determined by the fact of whether the identical arti-
cle delivered to a manufacturer is to be returned to the party making
the advance: Laflin and Rand Powder Co. v. Burkhardt, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1877.
Thus where logs are delivered at a siw-mill to be manufactured into
boards, or leather to a shoemaker to be made into shoes, etc., if the pro-
duct of the identical articles delivered is to be returned to the original
owner in a new form it is said to be a bailment, and the title never vests
in the manufacturer. If, on the other hand, the manufacturer is not
bound to return the same lumber or leather or other material, but may
deliver any other of equal value, it is said to be a sale or a loan, and the
title to the thing delivered vests in the manufacturer: Id.
Possession of Pledge-Euity.-Possession is of the essence of a
pledge, both at common and civil law, and without it no privilege can
exist as against third persons : Casey v. Cavaroc et at, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1877.
The pledgor may have the temporary possession of the pledge, as
special bailee, without defeating the legal possession of the pledgee; but
where the thing pledged has never been out of the pledgor's actual pos-
session, but has always been subject to his disposal by way of-collection,
sale, or exchange, no pledge or privilege exists as to third persons: Id.
Though, in such case, the pledgee might, by the law of Louisiana,
have a real action against the pledgor or his heirs to recover possession
of the thing, he cannot sustain a privilege thereon as against creditors,
or against a receiver or assignee who represents creditors : Id.
Equity will not regard i thing as done which is not done, when it
would injure third parties who have sustained detriment and acquired
rights by the things that have been done : Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Title to Negotiable Paper, how acquired, how lost-Malafides-Negli-
gence-How they affect Title to Negotiable Paper-Evidence-Prayers
and Instructions -If a lIarty take a negotiable bill or note before maturity
for consideration and without mala fides, such party acquires a good
title, notwithstanding there may have been negligence; and gross neg-
ligence while it may be evidence of mala fides, will not alone be sufficient
to defeat the plaintiff's title. Nothing less than proof of knowledge of
facts that show the want of authority on the part of the person trans-
ferring the note will be sufficient for that purpose : Citizens' National
Bank v. Hooper, 47 Md.
The plaintiff is not bound to make inquiry, and mere negligence,
however gross, not amounting to wilful and fraudulent blindness, while
it would be evidence of malafides, is not the same thing: Id.
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CIIAAMPERTY. See Trust and Trustee.
CHARITY.
Misnomer of Legatee- Uncertainty.-A misnomer of a corporation
legatee will not defeat a bequest if such legatee can be identified:
Goodell v. Ution. Association, 29 N. J. Eq.
A gift to '- Trinity Church Sunday School in Mount Holly, $1000, to
be saf'ely invested, the interest to be applied to making Christmas pres-
ence to the scholars of said school," is not a legal charity, and is void,
also, for uncertainty in not designating the kind of gifts, and because
such distribution is indiscriminate and devoid of all purpose: Id.
A gift of "the interest of $1000 yearly to help form a Young Men's
Christian Association," etc., is good as a charity, and will be applied not
)nly to assist in the formation of such association, but also in its main-
tenance: Id.
A gift to testator's brother (with a provision for a trustee or trustees
in his stead in case of his refusal or death), Iof $10,000, to the end
that the interest be applied at discretion to alleviating the wants and
sufferings of the deserving poor of Mount Holly," is a charity which
this court will protect and effectuate : Id.
Co.X ION CARRIER.
Examination of Goods by Consignee.-Where the consignor of goods
shipped by an express company instructs the company not to permit the
consignee to examine the goods before delivery and payment of charges,
the agent of the company is authorized to refuse such examination and
incurs no personal liability by returning the goods to the consignor:
Wiltse v. Barnes, 46 Iowa.
If the express company has a rule forbidding inspection of goods by
the consignee before delivery, it must appear that the rule was brought
to the knowledge of the shipper to be binding upon the consignee: Alt.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Intoxicating Liquors-License to sell-Local Police Laws -The sale,
by retail, of intoxicating liquors may be constitutionally regulated by
law, and in localities where the legislature, or its constitutionally or-
ginized agencies are of the opinion that the peace and good order of
society so require. license to carry on the retail traffic may be refused:
Anderson v. Cnomnonwealth, 13 Bush.
The question of license or no license is one properly of local police,
and may be regulated by lawfully constituted local agencies rdpresent-
ing and acting for the locad public, such as county courts, or the muni-
cipal authorities of towns and cities, or by the sense of the qualified
voters of a voting district taken under a law to provide therefor : 7d.
Vested Rights- Distribution of surplus of Intestate's Estate. where no
surrivi g Relatives within the Fth Degree- Power of Leyislature to dis-
turb Vested Rights by subsequent legislation-Statutory constrution.-
A bill was filed by Rock Hill College to compel the administrators of
;ames Stratton to pay over to the college the surplus remaining in their
h'Mds after the final settlement of the estate, the said Strnttnn having
died intestate, unmarried and leaving no relations within the fifth degree,
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who were by law entitled to claim such surplus. The college claimed
the surplus under sect. 136 of art. 93 of the code, by which the state
becomes entitled under such circumstances to the surplus for the use of
the college. The defendants demurred to the bill, relying upon the
Acts of 1876, ch. 295, and ch. 337, by which such surplus was directed
to be paid to the school commissioners. The demurrer was sustained in
the lower court, but on appeal it. was held: 1st. That the state has no
original prerogative right to appropriate such funds to its own use, in
the absence of statutory rules or distribution. In England, even in the
ancient period of her jurisprudence, when power was arbitrary and the
rights of the subject but ill defined, such prerogative was not claimed;
2d. Rights that pass and become vested under the existing law of the
land are beyond the control of the state through its legislature. The
mere change of the law does not divest or impair the rights of property
acquired before-the change, even though the legislature may intend the
new law so to operate ; 3d. The state, as to this fund, is a mere trustee,
with a full and explicit declaration of trust, made by authority of the
trustee itself. Such, however, would'not be the effect of a gratuitous
appropriation by the state of its own revenue; 5th. The matter of dis-
tribution of an intestate's personal estate is regulated by positive law,
and any person within the rules prescribed acquires a right of which he
cannot be divested by a retroactive law : Rock Hill -College v. Jones,
27 Md.
CONTRACT. See Specific Performance.
CORPORATION. See Charity; Equity.
Receier.-The court will authorize a receiver of a railroad company
to make all necessary repairs, and, if necessary, will charge the expense
ds a first lien on the property prior to existing mortgages thereon : Hioo-
ver v. Montclair, &c, Railway Co., 29 N J. Eq.
Receiver-Officer of Corporation.-An officer of a corporation, under
whose management it has become insolvent, is not a proper person to be
appointed its receiver: Mc Culough v. Merchants' Loan and Trust Co.,
29 N. J. Eq.
The power which creates a receiver may, at any time, put an end to
his functions, but it ought not to do so except for cause: Id.
Where an officer of a corporation has been appointed its receiver, and
it appears proper that his conduct, as such officer, should be investi-
gated, to ascertain whether he has not obtained an advantage which he
ought not to retain, sufficient cause for removal exists: Id.
Sale'by Assinee.-Fraud of Stockholder,-A sale by the assignee
of an insolvent corporatibn, made by him in good faith, is not invali-
dated or affected by the fraud of a stockholder committed without the
knowledge or privity of the assignee: Trevitt v. Converse, 31 Ohio St.
Subscriptions procured by Fraud.-Contracts of subscription to the
stock of a corporation, if procured by fraud, will be set aside. The
rule is universal, whatever fraud creates justice will destroy: Vreeland
v. New Jersey Stone Co, 29 N. J. Eq.
An oral contract of subscription will not be enforced under a charter
requiring that such contracts shall be mad'b in writing: ld.
Where a fraud is committed in the name of a corporation, by persons
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having tle right to speak for it, for their personal benefit, they will be
made to answer personally for the injury inflicted by their fraud : Md.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Extraditiou.
lhtoxication.-Where a charge of perjury is based upon testimony
given in reference to a past transaction, evidence that the accused was
"greatly intoxicated" at the time such transaction occurred, is a cir-
cumstance proper to be submitted to the consideration of the jury in
determining whether the accused knowingly testified falsely: Lytle v.
State, 31 Ohio St.
AIsanty.-In tile trial of a capital case, where homicide is admitted,
and the defence of insanity is set up, the burden of establishing the
defence by a preponderance of testimony rests upon defendant: Bergen
v. State, 31 Ohio St.
Micontrollable Propensity.-The uncontrollable propensity which will
relieve a person from the consequences of a crime, must have its origin
alone in a diseased or insane mind : State v. Mcwihorter, 46 Iowa.
To entitle one who has committed a criminal act to an acquittal on
the ground of insanity, his mental disease must have been such as to
destroy the power to comprehend rationally the nature and consequences
of his act, and overpower his will : Id.
One who commits a crime under the influence of an insane delusion,
is punishable if he knew that he was acting contrary to law: Id.
In a case of partial delusion, where the subject is not insane in other
respects, the law considers him as to his responsibility, in the same con-
dition as if the facts in regard .to which his delusion exists were real : Id.
Pleading-Stattort Offenes.-It is a well settled rule of criminal
pleading that an indictment ibr an offence created by statute must de-
scribe the offence in the words of the statute or in words of similar im-
port, and if the statute creating the offence contains in its enacting clause
exceptions, it is necessary to negative such exceptions in the indictment
so as to show that the defendant does not come within any of them:
Connor v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush.
DAMAGES.
Liabilii, of Railroad Companies- Coilpensatoiy and Punitive Dan-
ages-Dtty of Conductors on Railway Trains in ejecting Passengers -
That the jury may be allowed to give exemplary or punitive damages
against a railroad company, in an action by a passenger for illegal and
violent expulsion from their train, is no longer an open question in this
state: .Philadelphia, IF & B. Railroad Co. v. Larkin, 47 Md.
The jury may not only award to the plaintiff such sum as damages as
will compensate him for the injury to his person, feelings and character,
arising from the unlawful act of the defendant, but if they believe the
unlawful act was deliberately and forcibly done, then they may give
such exemplary darnages as they may consider a proper punishment for
the defendant: Id.
In ascertaining the extent of the injury, the jury may consider all
the facts which relate to the wrongful act of the defendant and its conse-
quences to the plaintiff; but they are not at liberty to co further, unless
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it was done wilfully, or was the result of that reckless indifference to
the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional violation of
them : 11.
In that case the jury are authorized, for the sake of public example,
to give such additional damages as the circumstances require; the tort
is aggravated by the evil motive, and on this rests the rule of exemplary
damages : Id.
Though the plaintiff may, in the first instance, render himself liable
to be ejected from the cars on account of his disorderly conduct, still in
accomplishing his removal it is the plain duty of the company to use no
more force than absolutely necessary; and if unnecessary force and vio-
lence be used t6 the injury of the plaintiff, the company is liable to an
action for damages: Id.
An excessive battery is a complete answer to a plea of son assault
demesne. and if wantonly and maliciously inflicted, subjects the party
making it to the same liability to exemplary damages as if he had been
the original wrongdoer: Id.
DEED. •
Calls-Metes and Bounds-Courses and Distances.-When a deed
conveying land does.not. accurately describe the land intended to be con-
veyed, it is the duty of the grantee to tender to.the grantor, for execu-
tion, a corrected or confirmatory deed: Heck v. Remka, 47 Md.
It is well'ettled law that, in locating lands, the calls always prevail
over the courses and Iistances : Id.
EQUYITY. See Bailment; Injunction.
Cor2oration- Waste of Funds by Officers.-The waste or misapplica-
tion of the funds of a corporation by its officers or agents, authorizes the
company to resort to equity in order to compel such officers to account
for such waste or breach of trust, even though it were conceded that an
adequate remedy at law exists. The existence of such remedy at law
would not oust this court of its jurisdiction: Citizens' Loan Association
v. Lyon et al., 29 N. J. Eq..
EVIDENCE.
Civil and Oiminal Cases-Deyree of Proof.-In a civil action to
recover damages for a criminal act, the same degree of proof is required
to establish the commission of the act as would be necessary to convict
the defendant upon an indictment for the crime : -Barton v. Thompson,
46 Iowa.
EXPRESS COMPANY. See Common Carrier.
EXTRADITION.
Trial for Offences not included' in the Extraditdon Treaty.-
Hawes was indicted in the Criminal Court of Kentucky for embez-
zlement and on four separate and distinct chbarges of forgery. He
made.his escape to Canada and on demand of the president was extra-
dited under the 10th article of the treaty concluded August 9th 1842,
to answer three charges of forgery. Two of the indictments for forgery
were dismissed, and on the other two Hawes was tried and acquitted.
He was yet held in custody and put on trial for embezzlement. Affida-
vits were filed by Hawes showing these facts, and a motion entered for
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his discharge from custody, for a continuance of the cases against him
and that hc be allowed to return to his domnicile and asylum in Canada.
This motion was sustained, and Hawes released from custody until the
further order of court. Held : That a treaty made by the United States
and a foreign power is not merely a compact or bargain, but a living law,
and as binding on the judicial tribunals, state and federal, as any other
law of Congress. In the extradition treaty referred to only seven classes
of crimes were enumerated for which persons charged might be de-
manded for extradition. Embezzlement was not one of them, and the
naming of certain offences excluded the idea that the demand might,
as matter of right, be made for any offence, not named in the treaty.
Hence an extradited prisoner should not be required to defend himself
against any offence, except that for which he is extradited ; much, less
for one for which his extradition could not be demanded. The right
of one government to demand and receive from another the custody of
an offender who has sought asylum upon its soil, depends solely upon
treaty stipulations between them, and the right is measured and re-
stricted by the provisions of the treaty. The prisoner did not secure
personal immunity by flight, and if he ever voluntarily returns within
the jurisdiction of the laws of this country he may be put on trial for
all offences with which he is charged ; yet as he sought asylum in Cana-
da and secured it, it would be a manifest disregard of the conditions of
the extradition to put him on trial for offences for which he was not
extradited and for which no legal demand could have been made for his
extradition: Hfawes v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush. "
FRAUD. See Corporation; Sale.
Mortgage to defraud Greditors-Bona Fide Purchaser-Equity Rule
as to -raud.-An assignee of a mortgage takes it subject to all defences
existing against the mortgagee in favor of the mortgagor, but free from
latent equities existing in favor of third persons: De Witt v. Van Sickle
et al., 29 N. J. Eq.
A mortgage executed as a step in a scheme to defraud creditors, will
be upheld, even against creditors, in the hands of a bond fi,le assignee
for value; but, in order to be considered an assignee for value, he must
pay money, surrender a valuable right, or assume an irrevocable obliga-
tion ; the surrender of a pre-existing debt is not a sufficient consider-
ation: Id.
Property conveyed in fraud of creditors will be reclaimed for the ben-
efit of creditors, no matter who may happen to hold it, if reclamation
can be effected without injustice to innocent third persons: 11.
He who buys any part of the avails of a scheme to defraud creditors,
in order to keep what he gets, must not only pay for it, but he must be
innocent of any purpose to further the fraud : id.
A person who wilfully closes his eyes to avoid seeing what he believes
he would see if he kept them open, must be considered to have seen what
any dan with his eyes open would ihave seen: Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
ParoZ Contract not to be peformed within the Year.-To make a parol
contract void within the Statute of Frauds it must appear affirmatively
that it was not to be performed within a-year. If performance by de-
VOL. XXVI.-68
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fendant could have been required by plaintiff within a year the contract
is valid : Walker v. Johnson, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
When a contract for the delivery of stone exists only in parol, a sub-
sequent verbal agreement varying the manner of delivery is binding: Id.
,Shl,rlff's Sale withh.-.Ak sheriff levied an execution on real estate,
it was duly advertised and bought by one T. at $11,050. T. refused to
execute a sale bond, or pay for the land. The land was re-advertised
and resold for 89000. In the sheriff's return no reference was made to
the uncompleted sale to T., but the second sale was regularly returned.
In an action against T. by the defendant in the execution for the differ-
ence in value, it was held, that the sale was within the Statute of Frauds
and a demurrer to the petition was properly sustained: Linn Boyd To-
bacto Warehouse CJo. v. Turrill, 13 Bush.
Where a contract for land is executory on both sides, it is necessary
that the sale and the price both be evidenced by a memorandum signed
by the parties to be charged: JR.
The sheriff in such a case as this is the legal agent of the plaintiff
and defendant in the execution, and of the purchaser, and might by his
official return on the execution have taken the case out of the statute,
but his private memorandum of the sale could not have this effect: ld.
GUARANTY.
Parol Evidence to affect Written.-A guarantor, in writing, of the
payment of a debt when due, will not be permitted to show by parol,
that at the time the guaranty was delivered, it was understood between
him and the guarantee, that he should be.liable only as a guarantor of
the collection of the debt: Neill v. Board of Trustees of Ohio Agricul-
tural College, 31 Ohio St.
3. subscribed $100, and promised to pay the same to the Ohio Agri-
cultural and Mechanical College, in consideration that said college
should be located at a specified place. N., in writing, at the same time
and place, and upon the same consideration, guaranteed the payment
of the sum so subscribed. Said subscription, with the guaranty thereto
annexed, was delivered to and accepted by the Trustees of the College,
upon the consideration aforesaid, as one instrument : Hel, that the
subscriber and guarantor may be jointly sued on said instrument: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Legacy in lieu of Dower.-Revocation of electino to take.-A widow's
election to take her dower instead of a legacy in lieu thereof, made
under a mistake as to her rights, may be revoked, nune pro tune, and
she placed in statu guo, unless the situation has so changed since her
election that it cannot be done without prejudice to the subsequently-
acquired rights of others : Macknet v. Macknet, 29 N. J. Eq.
INJUNCTION.
Against Public Improvement-Laches.-A suitor who seeks to have a
public improvement enjoined must apply promptly, show an invasion of
a clear right, and that he has no other adequate remedy : Traphagenr et
al. v. Mayor and Alderman of Jersey City, 29 N. J. Eq.
A suitor who by laches has made it impossible for the court to enjoin
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his adversary without inflicting great injury upon him, will be refused
the aid he asks and left to pursue his ordinary legal remedy : 1,7.
An injunction will be refused to a complainant who has intentionally
delayed his application until he has obtained an inequitable advantage
of the defendant: I.
The use of a public street for the construction of a sewer, is lawful:
Id.
INSANITY. See Criminal Law; Lunatic.
INTOXICATING LIQuoRs. See Constitutional Law.
INTOXICATION. See Criminal Law.
JUDG."MENT. See Limitations, Statnte Of-
Vacation, of-egligence of Attorney.-The negligence of attorneys
in failing to interpose a defence where a valid one existed, does not con-
stitute a sufficient ground for disturbing a judgment: Jones v. Leech,
46 Iowa.
Cannot be Alternative.-In an action in the Circuit Court the court
found the garnishee to be liable for one of two amounts to be determined
by a future contingency: Held, that such finding did not constitute a
judgment, and that upon the transfer of the case to the District Court,
the garnishee had the right to make a further answer: Battell & Collins
v. Lowery et al., 46 Iowa.
JUDICIAL SALE.
Representations of Giuardian.-The purchaser of real estate at
guardian's sale has no rights'to infer from the guardian's assurance that
he will give a good title, that he is acquiring a title in fee simple, and
such assurance being given in good faith and without fraudulent intent,
the purchaser is not entitled to equitable relief even though he may have
been misled thereby: Findley v. Richardson, 46 Iowa.
The purchaser having acquired all the interest of the ward in the
land, cannot refuse to pay a promissory note given for the purchase-
money on the ground of a failure of consideration: Id.
Title under.-The rule of caveat emptor applies to all sales of real
estate made under judgments, after confirmation. Before the sale is
confirmed by the chancellor he may grant relief and quash the bonds, if
it is discovered that the vendee acquires no title or some equitable reason
is presented for cancelling the bid and bonds of the purchaser. But
after confirmation as there is no warranty of title there can be no relief
for defects of title: Farmers' Bank of Kentuck 3 v. Peter, &c., 13 Bush.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
When. begins to run against Jlgment binding Land.-The Statute of
Limitations for the action to recover possession of land is not applicable
to that lien of a judgment creditor on the land, though the judgment
debtor may sell and convey the land with possession to the party setting
up the statute: Pratt v. Pratt, S. C. U. S. Oct. Term 1877.
The statute does not begin to run in such case until the land has been
sold under the judgment and the purchaser becomes entitled to a deed,
because until then there is no right of entry or right of action against
te defendant in any one: Id.
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But as soon as the judgment creditbr places himself, by a sale and
purchase of the land, in a condition that he can bring suit for the pos-
session, the statute begins to run against him. These propositions are
applicable to the Illinois Act of 1835, limiting actions for the recovery
of land to seven years: Id.
LOCAL OPTION. See Constitutional Law.
LUNATIC.
Judgment against.-A judgment rendered against an insane person,
without the intervention of a trustee or guardian, and in favor of one
taving knowledge of the insanity, is not void: Johnson, Guardian, v.
Pomeroy, 31 Ohio St.
In a proceeding in aid of execution, such judgment cannot be
impeached by the guardian of the judgment debtor without showing
some fraud or unfairness on the part of the creditor in obtaining the
judgment: Id.
Where a proceeding in aid of exeention has been commenced, and
the judgment debtor is afterward adjudged to be insane, the guardian
of such debtor cannot resist a decree preferring such creditor by showing
that his ward was insane before the commencement of the proceeding
and that his estate is- insolvent: Id.
MANDAMUS.
Right of a Private C'tizen to sue out the Writ of Mandamus to compel
Performance of Duty by a Public Coporation-Power of Legislature
over Mfunic al Corporations- Duties of Municvipal Corporations as to
Highways.-The Act of 1876, ch. 220, authorized and required the
mayor and city council of Baltimore to take charge of and maintain as
a public highway, a certain bridge over Gwynn's Falls, in the city of
Baltimore, known as" Harman's bridge." On the refusal of the said mayor
and city council of Baltimore to do so, P. filed his petition in the Superior
Court of said city for a mandamus, to compel the mayor and city council
to assume the charge of the said bridge, and maintain it as a public
highway, as required by the said Act of 1876. The said mayor and
city council demurred to the petition, and by tonsent of parties a pro
forma judgment was rendered sustaining the demurrer. On appeal it
was held: 1st. That the legislature had the power to impose this duty
upon the appellee: 2d. That the appellant had the right to sue out the
writ of mandamus to compel the performance of this duty: Pumphrey
v. Mayor'and City Council of Baltimore, 47 Md.
Where the law leaves it to the discretion of a municipal corporation
to assume control over a jublic highway or not, it would seem that at
any time before the property was actually acquired and while the pro-
ceedings were in fieri, the corporation'would have the right to change
its purpose, though it had taken steps to assume control over it: Id.
But the rights and obligations of the appellee depend upon the Act
of 1876, which is mandatory in its terms, and liy which the discretion
of the city over the subject has been taken away, and it is "directed
and required" to take charge and possession of the bridge : Id.
Though the city of Baltimore is a public corporatidn, it is not exempt
from the control of the legislature. A public 'corporation is created for
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political purposes, with political power to be exercised for purposes con-
nected with the public good; an instrument of the government subject
to the control of the legislature : Id.
It is one of the ordinary duties of a municipal corporation to make
and keep in repair the bridges on the highways belonging to it: Id.
Where the petitioner for the writ of mandamus to compel the per-
formance of a duty by a public corporation has a personal interest in
the matter different in kind from that of the general public, he is enti-
tled to the writ - Id.
There is a decided preponderance of American authority in favor of
the doctrine that private persons may move for a mandamus to enforce
a public duty, not due to the government as such, without the interven-
tion of the government law officer : Id.
The petition for a mandamus is always addressed to the discretion of
the court: Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Evidence- Competency of Bervant.-Where the incompetency and
carelessness of an engineer employed by the defendant, a mining company,
were alleged to have been the cause of an injury, proof that he was
afterward discharged by defendant and by a subsequent employer was
not competent evidence to support such allegation : Couch v. Watson
Coal Co., 46 Iowa.
In an action against a coal company for injuries caused by the alleged
negligence of its engineer, the superintendent of the company was
properly allowed to state whether in his opinion the engineer was com-
petent, without previously showing himself to be an expert: Id.
The plaintiff had the right to introduce proof of the character of
defendant's machinery; whether or not he had knowledge of its alleged
defects before the accident was a question to be considered by the jury
under the instructions of the court: Id.
Evidence of specific acts of negligence on the part of the engineer
would be admissible as tending to establish the negligence of the defendant
in continuing to employ him, but such evidence should not be admitted




Conveyance to secure Payment of Money is mortgage-Power of sale
must be followed strictly.-A conveyance of land to secure the payment
of a sum of money with power of sale, whether made to the creditor or
a third person, is in equity a mortgage, if there is left a right to redeem
on payment of the debt thereby secured: Shillaber v. Robinson, S. C.
U. S. Oct. Term 1877.
A sale under the power in such an instrument must be made in strict
conformity to the directions therein prescribed, or to such as may be
prescribed by statute, or the sale will be absolutely void : Id.
A sale made on six weeks' notice, though followed by conveyance,
when the mortgage and the statute of the state require twelve, is void,
and does not divest the equity of the party who had the right of redemp-
tion: Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
A person holding the strict legal title, with no other right than a lien
for a given sum, who sells the land to innocent purchasers, must account
to the holder of the equity for all he receives beyond his lien: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Mandamus.
NEGLIGENCE.
Liability of Railroad Companies- Contributory Negligence-Evidence
- Wl'hen the Court will instruct the Jury that there is no Evidence.-In
order to maintain an action against a railroad company for injuries
received, &c., it must be proved that the injury was caused by the negli-
gence of the defendant or its agents; and it must not appear from the
evidence that want of ordinary care and prudence on the part of the
person injured directly contributed to the injury: State, use of Poy, v.
Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Co., 47 Md.
Railroad companies, while prosecuting their lawful business, are bound
to use ordinary and reasonable care to avoid inflicting injuries upon
others : I7.
Railroad trains are liable to be detained by various causes, without
any fault of the company, and negligence cannot be imputed to the-
company from the fact that a train may be* behind the usual time : Id.
The fhct of negligence is for the jury to decide where there is evidence
legally sufficient to prove it, but in the absence of such evidence, it is
the duty of the court to withhold the case from the jury : rd.
The onus probandi as to negligence on the part of the company is on
the plaintiff, as it is the ground of his action : Id.
OFFICER. See Statute.
RAILROAD. See Damages; Neglgence.
Insolvent-Power of Chancery over.-Two railroads were in the hands
of receivers, appointed by this court under insolvency proceedings.
ield, that the court had power, on the application of either receiver,
to modify a contract made before their insolvency, so as to equitably
re-adjust the rates agreed upon by them for terminal facilities, and;
also, for the use of part of one road by the other company : Petition
of the receivers of the New Jersey and New York Railway Company
for relief, 29 F. N. Eq.
RECEIVEa. See Corporation ; Rdilroad.
SALE.
Fraud and Fraudulent, Gontracts- When Right of Action accrues.-
Where goods are obtained by means of a fraudulent purchase, the vendor
has a right to disaffirm the contract, so as to revest the property in him-
self and to recover its value in an action of tort against the vendee:
Dellone v. Rull, 47 Md.
But if the plaintiff make the contract his cause of action he must be
bound by its terms, and cannot maintain his suit until the money becomes
due: Id.
The vendor cannot sue for the price of. goods before the period of
credit has expired; by so doing he affirms the contract; but-he can
disaffirm the contract and sue in tort for the value of the goods :. 7d.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
The Act of 1864, ch. 366, does riot alter this rule as to cases arising
under that statute Id.
SHERIFF'S SALE. See Frauds, Statute of.
SLANDER.
Privileged Communication.-B. sued M. for charging him with the
crime of perjury in an action pending before a justice, to which action
M. was a party, giving at length the words used. M. confessed the
speaking of the words and pleaded in avoidance, that he managed his
own case before the justice and that all he said was addressed to the
court in attempting to sustain his case, and f9 r no other purpose, and
was not in excess of his lawful right to indulge in fair criticism. Hreld,
that in such a case it was error to instruct the jury that if the words
charged were spoken and were false, then the law implies malice. The
instruction ought to have been qualified, and the jury instructed to find -
for the defendant if the words spoken by hiln were pertinent and
material to the question in controversy in the action before the justice:
Moryan, v. Booth, 13 Bush.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Contract-Autuality.-A contract to be specifically enforced must be
such that it might, at the time it was entered into, have been enforced
by either of the parties against the other, and if the one party be
incapable of performance he cannot enforce it upon the other: Luse v.
Deitz, 46 Iowa.
L. entered into a contract with D. to convey to him a brewery which
at the time of the execution of the contract was the property of his wife;
subsequently he tendered to D. a deed to the property, executed by him-
self and wife, which D. refused to accept: Held, that the contract could
not be specifically enforced: Id.
E itable Title to Land- Contracts to purchase-Purchzasers without
notice- (ertaintyl of averment and sufficiencoi of noof-Disco'ery-
Answers in Chancey-Parties. -W here application fbr the specific per-
formiance of a contract for the purchase of land is made by the purchaser,
or some one in privity with him, having knowledge of the terms of the
contract, courts of equity require that the terms of the contract shall be
fully and particularly stated, so that it may appear to the court to possess
all the elements of fairness, mutuality and certainty in all its parts:
Light Street Bridge Co. v. Bannon, Admiistrator of Lawrence, 47 Md.
But such strictness is not required as to the averments in the bill
where the complainants are strangers to the contract, and have not full
and particular knowledge of its terms; and especially where the del1ects
in the averments may be supplied by proof: Id.
Where a bill is filed for the sale of an equitable interest in land, and
it appears that since the date of the contract creating such equitable
title, the land has been sold, the purchaser thereof should be made a
party to the suit in order that his rights may be protected : .]d.
STATUTE.
Construction of.-Statutes directing the mode of procedure of public
officers where there are no negative words restricting the action and
nothing showing a different intent are diretory : Parish v. E licellet al.,
46 Iowa.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SURETY.
Arrest of Principal.-It is no defence for the surety on a bail-bond
or forfeited recognisauce, that his principal has been arrested and is
being detained by the United States on a charge against him: Cor-
monwealth v. House, 13 Bush.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.
Hostile feelings between Trustee and Cestui gue trust- Wen cause for
removal-Attorney- Chantperty.-W bile in a case where the trustee has
a discretionary power over the rights of the cestui que trust, and has
duties to discharge which necessarily bring him into personal intercourse
with the latter, a state of mutual illwill or hostile feeling may justify a
court in removing the trustee, it is not sufficient cause where no such
intercourse is required and the duties are merely formal and ministerial,
and no neglect of duty or misconduct is established against the trustee:
McPherson v. Cox, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
A contract to pay a specific sum of money to a lawyer for his services
in a suit concerning real estate out of the proceeds of said land when sold
by the client, if recovered, is not champertous, because he neither pays
costs nor accepts the land or any part of it as his compensation: Id.
Nor is it void under the Statute of Frauds because not in writing, for
it may be performed within the year: Id.
The land being recovered in the action in which the attorney was
employed. and sold by the owner for $38,000, for which a bond was taken
and left with the attorney, he has a lien on the bond for his fee both by
express contract and by reason of the lien which the law gives an attorney
on the papers of his client left in his hands for any bajance due him
for services: Id.
Where, under the circumstances mentioned, the client brings a bill in
chancery to remove the attorney from his position as trustee in a deed
to secure the purchase-money and for a delivery of the bond, it is the
duty of the court to decide on the existence and amount of the lieu set
up by the attorney in his answer, and to decree the delivery of the bond
on payment of amount of the lien, if one be found to exist: Id.
Though the defendant by neglecting to file a cross-bill can have no
decree for affirmative relief, it is proper that the court should establish
the conditions on which the delivery of the -bond to complainant,
according to the prayer of the bill, should be made, and require it to be
done on that condition being complied with: Id.-
TITLE. See Vendor and Purchaser.
V rDOR AND PURCHASER.
R aw inz Mide-Bona fide Purchaser-Possession.-In a suit in this
court to quiet title and restrain an action of ejectment, a deposition of a
witness in that action who has since died is competent, the action at law
having been substantially between -the same parties and for the same
land: Wanner et a. v. Sisson, 29 N. J. Eq.
A person who, having discovered a flaw in a title to land, purchases
the title for speculation, with a view to ousting the possessors, who claim
to be the real owners, is not a bona fide purchaser : Id.
Possession by a man or his tenant is notice of the title, equitable as
well as legal, under which he claims the property: Id.
